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Abstract
This article reviews, as usual, the recent performance of the main Latin American 
economies, in a setting where the emerging economies have faced a series of adverse 
shocks. There has been a considerable downward revision of the growth forecast for the 
region in 2018, driven mainly by idiosyncratic factors: the severe recession in Argentina 
and a slower-than-expected recovery in Brazil. Furthermore, the risks remain predominantly 
on the downside. One of these risks – a tightening of the pace of monetary policy 
normalisation in the United States – is analysed in more detail in the article.
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Since the publication of the previous half-yearly report on the Latin American economy in 
April, the world economic recovery has shown some signs of fatigue and there are growing 
cross-country divergences. The US economy has achieved greater buoyancy than other 
developed economies and the emerging economies have faced a series of adverse shocks 
– tighter global financial conditions, heightened trade tensions and higher oil prices – with 
varying degrees of resilience. Against this backdrop, the main Latin American economies 
have also behaved differently, influenced by many idiosyncratic factors.
The growth forecast for the region1 as a whole in 2018 has been revised substantially 
downwards, owing especially to the severe recession in Argentina and a slower-than-
expected recovery in Brazil. Q2 was particularly negative, with a contraction of activity in 
the region, although the performance by country was mixed; in fact, Chile, Colombia and 
Peru remained highly buoyant. Specifically, Latin American growth is expected to stand at 
1.5% in 2018, below potential growth and that posted by other emerging economies and 
regions, and to be slightly higher than 2% in 2019, with marked cross-country differences 
(see Chart 1). 
The risks remain predominantly on the downside, both those stemming from the global 
environment – arising from a possible swifter-than-expected normalisation of monetary policy 
in the United States (see Box 1), the effects of trade tensions and higher oil prices – and those 
which are country-specific – fiscal problems in Brazil, the monetary and fiscal adjustment in 
Argentina and, in Mexico’s case, the commercial relationship with the US. The region’s 
economies are facing the current situation of the tightening of global financial conditions from 
a position of flexible exchange rates which provides them with a cushion against external 
shocks. Nevertheless, as occurred previously between 2015 and 2017, exchange rate 
depreciations can limit the capacity of monetary policies to operate counter-cyclically if they 
feed through to prices; furthermore, fiscal policies have hardly any room to provide support to 
growth. Together with this report an analytical article is published on recent developments in 
the Argentinian economy and the agreement negotiated between Argentina and the IMF.
In 2018 the world economy is estimated to grow at a rate of 3.7% boosted by the United 
States and emerging Asia, especially China. The Chinese authorities have relaxed fiscal 
and monetary policies in order to moderate the impact of trade tensions with the United 
States and of the adjustment process towards lower debt levels. In the United States, the 
fiscal stimulus is contributing to maintain growth above potential, while the Federal 
Reserve continues the process of monetary policy normalisation. The foregoing has 
prompted an appreciation of the dollar and a tightening of global financial conditions. This 
has impacted the emerging economies (see Charts 2.1 and 2.2), many of which have high 
levels of foreign currency debt, triggering critical situations in those that are more reliant 
on external funding and have less credible economic policies, such as Argentina and 
Turkey. However, for the moment there has been no significant contagion to emerging 
markets as a whole, as indicated by the fact that the exchange rate depreciations and the 
widening of the credit spreads have been focused on the most vulnerable economies. 
Also, the stock market indices of those economies with significant links to global value 
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1  The aggregate of the region includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. No data are available 
for Venezuela. 
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chains (China, South Korea and Hong Kong) have also been affected. In comparative 
terms, this episode of instability has had a similar impact on the financial markets of 
emerging economies to that known as the “taper tantrum”2 in 2013.
Between April and September 2018, the performance of Latin American financial markets, 
albeit highly diverse, was slightly worse than that of other emerging financial markets. 
Along with the Argentine peso (down 47%), the Brazilian real fell sharply, by around 19%, 
(Chart 2.3) owing essentially to the fiscal vulnerabilities of this economy. By contrast, the 
currencies of the Andean countries held relatively stable, whereas the Mexican peso 
appreciated significantly following the presidential elections and the progress in the 
renegotiation of the trade agreement with the United States and Canada. Finally, the result 
of the first round of the presidential elections in Brazil prompted a strong appreciation of 
the real.3 There was also diversity in the stock markets (Chart 2.4) where energy-related 
sectors recorded a better performance; the higher weight of firms from this sector in Latin 
American indices may explain their slightly less negative performance compared with 
Asian stock markets, which posted sharp declines following the announcement of new 
tariffs for China. Conversely, the worsening of the sovereign spreads of Latin American 
countries exceeded that of other emerging markets (Chart  2.5), mainly in the case of 
Argentina and, to a lesser degree, of Brazil. The differences in the behaviour of the various 
Latin American financial markets is reflected in the changes in the financial stress indices4 
(Chart 2.6), which rose in Brazil and Colombia, fell in Mexico, and held at similar levels to 
those at the beginning of the year in Chile.
SOURCE: Latin American Consensus Forecasts.
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The growth projections for the region decreased considerably compared with the latest report of April 2018, mainly owing to a weaker-than-expected 
recovery in Brazil and, in particular, to the severe recession in Argentina, leading to projected negative growth rates for 2018 and 2019. The growth 
estimates for the other economies remained stable and even improved slightly, as in the case of Chile.
DownloadEXCEL
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2  This episode refers to the financial market turmoil resulting from the announcement of the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve in May 2013 that the Federal Reserve might begin to reduce the pace of asset purchases. The 
statement led to an increase in US Treasury longer-dated bond yields and a movement of flight to quality and of 
outflow of funds from emerging markets. 
3  Also noteworthy is the monetary reform applied in Venezuela, with the unification of the exchange rates and the 
creation of a new currency, the sovereign bolivar, with an initial exchange rate against the dollar of 60 bolivar per 
dollar, marking a devaluation of 95% with respect to the value of the previous currency.
4  The construction of the index is described in Box 1 of the “Report on the Latin American Economy: Second Half 
of 2016”, Economic Bulletin, October 2016.
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SOURCES: Banco de España, Datastream and JP Morgan.
THE WORSENING OF THE FINANCIAL INDICATORS OF EMERGING ECONOMIES WAS SHARPER IN COUNTRIES
SUCH AS ARGENTINA AND TURKEY, AND SHOWED SOME DEGREE OF MARKET DISCRIMINATION BASED
ON ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS
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The market indicators of emerging economies deteriorated as from May, against a backdrop of tighter financial conditions in the United States. Two of 
the countries affected most were Argentina and Brazil, whose exchange rates depreciated sharply, whereas the Mexican peso rallied on the prospects 
of a new trade agreement with the United States and Canada. As in the other emerging economies, some degree of market discrimination was observed, 
as shown by the different developments in financial stress indices.
 ARGENTINA  BRAZIL  MEXICO  CHILE  COLOMBIA LATIN AMERICA (MSCI, LOCAL CURRENCY)
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Capital flows towards Latin America changed sign in 2018, as in other emerging regions. 
Gross inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the region shrank slightly in the first 
half of 2018, due to Colombia and Brazil, and portfolio inflows decreased by almost 
$10 billion, on account of net outflows from Argentina, Brazil and Chile in Q2 (see Charts 3.1 
and 3.2). On the primary markets, the placement of debt securities, which was buoyant 
until April, fell by 86% between June and September with respect to the same period in 
2017, on account of limited issuance in Brazil (Chart 3.3). Noteworthy is the high weight of 
bank debt issues in Chile and Mexico, along with sovereign and energy utility issues. 
International reserves fell, although they remain above the historical average (see Chart 3.4).
After posting quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.7% in 2018 Q1, the GDP of the main Latin 
American economies5 contracted by 0.3% in Q2 (see Table 1 and Chart 4). The fall was 
ACTIVITY AND DEMAND 
SOURCES: Datastream, Dealogic, Institute of International Finance, JPMorgan, IMF and national statistics.
a Four-quarter cumulated data.
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Capital inflows into Latin America stabilised at low levels in the second quarter, although the issue figures in the third quarter pointed to a decline in inflows 
in that period. The drop in issues was as a result of the absence of Argentina and the strong contraction in placements in Brazil. Despite this, international 
reserves did not decrease in the first half of the year.
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5  In Venezuela, where official data remain unavailable, despite attempts to stabilise the economy (the change of the unit 
of account in the monetary system, the depreciation of the official exchange rate, tax hikes, adjustments to fuel prices 
and the increase in the minimum wage), the indicators show its economy remains immersed in a deep recession and 
prices are increasing at a rate which can be described as hyperinflation according to the usual indicators.
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SOURCES: Datastream and national statistics.
a Seasonally adjusted.
b Latin America-6: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Latin America-5: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
c Four-quarter moving average.
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 September
GDP (quarter-on-quarter rate) (a)
    Latin America-6 (b) 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.7 -0.3
    Argentina 0.1 0.7 0.7 1.9 0.5 0.8 0.7 -4.0
    Brazil -0.8 -0.3 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.2
    Mexico 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.8 1.0 -0.2
    Chile 0.3 0.2 -0.5 0.8 2.4 0.7 1.2 0.7
    Colombia 0.4 1.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.0 0.9 0.6
    Peru 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.0 2.4 1.4
GDP (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America-6 (b) -0.3 1.8 -0.4 0.2 1.2 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.2 1.2
    Argentina -1.8 2.9 -3.3 -1.1 0.6 3.0 3.8 3.9 3.9 -4.2
    Brazil -3.5 1.0 -2.7 -2.5 0.0 0.4 1.4 2.1 1.2 1.0
    Mexico (a) 2.6 2.3 2.2 3.3 3.0 3.0 1.7 1.6 2.3 1.6
    Chile 1.3 1.5 1.2 0.3 -0.4 0.5 2.5 3.3 4.4 5.3
    Colombia (a) 2.0 1.8 0.8 1.4 1.4 2.2 1.8 1.6 2.6 2.5
    Peru 4.0 2.5 4.7 3.1 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.3 3.1 5.4
CPI (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America-5 (b) 6.0 4.3 6.0 5.2 4.7 4.4 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.5 4.3
    Brazil 8.7 3.4 8.7 7.0 4.9 3.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 3.3 4.5
    Mexico 2.8 6.0 2.8 3.2 5.0 6.1 6.5 6.6 5.3 4.6 5.0
    Chile 3.8 2.2 3.5 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.2 3.1
    Colombia 7.5 4.3 8.1 6.1 5.1 4.3 3.7 4.1 3.4 3.2 3.2
    Peru 3.6 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.0 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.2
Budget balance (% of GDP) (c)
    Latin America-6 (b) -5.6 -4.7 -5.5 -5.6 -5.2 -5.6 -5.0 -4.7 -5.0 -4.8
    Argentina -4.5 -6.0 -3.6 -4.5 -4.6 -5.2 -5.6 -6.0 -5.7 -5.1
    Brazil -9.0 -7.8 -9.3 -9.0 -9.1 -9.5 -8.8 -7.8 -7.4 -7.3
    Mexico -3.0 -1.0 -2.6 -3.0 -1.3 -1.9 -1.1 -1.0 -2.9 -2.7
    Chile -2.7 -2.8 -2.5 -2.7 -3.3 -2.9 -2.7 -2.8 -2.7 -2.6
    Colombia -3.8 -3.2 -3.8 -3.8 -4.2 -4.1 -3.2 -3.2 -2.9 -3.7
    Peru -2.3 -3.2 -3.0 -2.3 -2.2 -2.6 -3.0 -3.2 -3.4 -2.4
Public debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America-6 (b) 54.1 55.3 53.0 54.1 53.9 54.2 55.0 55.3 55.9 —
    Argentina 49.7 50.3 44.0 49.7 49.1 48.9 49.5 50.4 51.4 —
    Brazil 70.0 74.0 70.1 70.0 71.3 72.8 73.8 74.0 75.3 77.2
    Mexico 49.4 47.2 48.0 49.4 47.3 46.0 46.9 47.2 46.9 47.6
    Chile 21.0 23.6 20.2 21.0 21.9 22.5 23.0 23.6 24.6 23.5
    Colombia 42.4 43.0 41.7 42.4 42.8 42.9 43.3 43.0 43.2 44.6
    Peru 23.8 24.9 22.8 23.8 23.0 24.2 24.2 24.9 23.8 23.7
Current account balance (% of GDP) (c)
    Latin America-6 (b) -2.1 -1.7 -2.3 -2.1 -2.0 -1.8 -1.7 -1.7 -1.6 -1.8
    Argentina -2.7 -4.9 -2.7 -2.7 -2.9 -3.5 -4.2 -4.9 -5.2 -5.6
    Brazil -1.3 -0.5 -1.4 -1.3 -1.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7
    Mexico -2.2 -1.7 -2.5 -2.2 -2.4 -1.9 -1.8 -1.7 -1.5 -1.6
    Chile -1.4 -1.5 -2.0 -1.4 -2.0 -2.1 -1.7 -1.5 -1.1 -1.2
    Colombia -4.2 -3.4 -4.8 -4.2 -4.1 -4.0 -3.7 -3.4 -3.1 -3.2
    Peru -2.7 -1.1 -3.6 -2.7 -2.0 -1.1 -0.7 -1.1 -1.2 -1.4
External debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America-6 (b) 36.7 34.5 37.6 36.5 35.7 35.0 35.1 34.5 34.8 34.2
    Argentina 32.7 36.8 31.5 32.7 34.3 34.1 35.2 36.8 39.3 41.6
    Brazil 37.6 32.5 40.0 37.4 35.2 33.5 33.6 32.5 33.1 32.7
    Mexico 29.3 29.0 29.1 29.3 29.6 29.6 29.6 29.0 28.7 28.4
    Chile 66.7 65.5 69.1 66.7 64.6 65.4 65.4 65.5 63.8 59.5
    Colombia 42.5 39.6 42.1 42.4 40.9 39.9 40.4 39.6 39.4 38.4
    Peru 38.4 35.9 39.1 38.3 37.7 38.6 38.0 35.9 35.1 33.8
20182017
2016 2017
2016
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1
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due to the steep decline in Argentina’s GDP (-4%), partly caused by the drought and its 
effects on agricultural activity, the falling-off of activity in Mexico, which is expected to be 
temporary,6 and low growth in Brazil, partly owing to the lorry drivers’ strike of May and 
June. GDP in Colombia, Chile and Peru accelerated, reaching year-on-year rates of above 
5% in these last two countries. By component, the positive contribution of investment 
continued, whereas a slowdown in private consumption was discernible in Q2. Net external 
demand continued to show a negative contribution to GDP, albeit somewhat lower than 
that recorded in the second half of 2017, as a result of a slight reduction in imports. 
The current account balances continued to show small deficits, by historical standards, 
due to favourable trade balance performances, expect in Colombia, where, however, it 
SOURCE: Datastream and national statistics.
a The dots represent the October 2018 forecasts for 2018 and 2019 by Latin American Consensus Forecasts.
b Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru.
STRONG SLOWDOWN IN THE ARGENTINE ECONOMY, WEAK GROWTH IN BRAZIL AND A SOUND 
PERFORMANCE IN CHILE, COLOMBIA AND PERU
CHART 4
-8
-4
0
4
8
12
 ARGENTINA  BRAZIL LATIN AMERICA-4 (b)
3  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Year-on-year rate
%
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
 CHILE  COLOMBIA  PERU  MEXICO
4  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Year-on-year rate
%
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
EXTERNAL DEMAND GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
STOCKBUILDING GDP
2  CONTRIBUTIONS TO YEAR-ON-YEAR GDP GROWTH.
LATIN AMERICA-6
pp
-5.0
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
%
1  GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
Quarter-on-quarter rate
Aggregate growth in the region decreased to 1.2% year on year in 2018 Q2, down from 2.2% in Q1, largely weighed on by the steep decline in Argentina’s 
GDP (-4% quarter on quarter), the falling-off of activity in Mexico and weak growth in Brazil. In Chile and Peru, growth reached year-on-year rates of above 
5%. The external sector continued to make a negative contribution in Q2, although it was more moderate than in Q1, and the positive contributions of 
private consumption and investment fell slightly.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
(a)
2019
(a)
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
(a)
2019
(a)
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
6  The preliminary GDP figure for Mexico in Q3 shows a quarter-on-quarter increase of 0.9%.
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decreased slightly, and in Argentina (see Chart  5.1). The terms of trade performed 
differently: they improved in Colombia (due to higher oil prices), were stable in Mexico and 
decreased in the other countries. In Chile and Peru the decline was due to the fall in 
copper prices, as a result of trade tensions and the slowdown in China (see Chart 5.2). In 
the region’s labour markets, small reductions were only visible in the unemployment rates 
in Brazil and Mexico, although their respective starting points were very different (see 
Chart 5.3). Lastly, credit to the private sector in real terms contracted in the main economies 
(see Chart 5.4).
After the lows reached in the early months of the year, inflation has begun to rise gradually 
(see Chart 6.1) as a result of higher energy prices, the closing of output gaps and, to a 
lesser degree, currency depreciations and their pass-through to final prices. In Chile, 
Colombia and Peru, inflation stands within central bank target ranges and inflationary 
pressure from currency depreciations is low. In Brazil, inflation has increased to a greater 
extent due to the (temporary) effect of the lorry drivers’ strike, although no second-round 
effects are expected. 
INFLATION AND ECONOMIC 
POLICIES 
SOURCE: Datastream.
a 2018 Q2.
b August 2018.
c Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
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EXTERNAL SECTOR, PRIVATE-SECTOR CREDIT AND UNEMPLOYMENT CHART 5
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In general, the current account balances continued to show small deficits by historical standards, with the notable exception of Argentina. The terms of trade 
performed differently across countries, depending mainly on developments in commodity export prices. There were small changes in unemployment rates 
and private-sector credit contracted in real terms in the main economies.
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Core inflation rose only slightly (see Chart 6.2) and expectations for end-2018 are consistent 
with the fulfilment of the inflation targets (see Table 2). The exceptions to this behaviour are 
Mexico, where inflation (and the expectations for 2018) remain above the target range, and 
Argentina, where year-on-year inflation stood at 40.5% in September, mainly as a result of 
the depreciation of the peso and the reduction in transport subsidies (see the analytical 
article on Argentina which accompanies this report).
Against this backdrop of greater uncertainty, tighter financial conditions and inflation under 
control – except for Argentina7 – there have been few monetary policy movements by the 
region’s central banks since April. Colombia’s central bank cut the policy interest rate by 
25 bp (to 4.25%) in April and Mexico’s increased it by the same amount (to 7.75%) in June, 
continuing in both cases with the monetary cycles initiated in previous months. At end-
October Chile’s central bank raised the policy interest rate by 25  bp (to 2.75%), thus 
FUENTES: Bloomberg,
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Inflation has begun to rise gradually in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru (as a result of higher energy prices, the closing of output gaps, currency depreciations 
and other idiosyncratic factors), while core inflation and inflation expectations rose only slightly. In Mexico, inflation remained above the target range and did 
not decline as expected and, in Argentina, year-on-year inflation stood at 40.5% in September, mainly as a result of the depreciation of the peso and the 
reduction in transport subsidies. Except in Argentina, there have only been small movements in the policy interest rates set by central banks in the region.
7  Argentina’s central bank raised key policy rates from 27.25%, their level at end-April, to 60% in August.
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beginning a monetary tightening cycle which is expected to spread over the coming 
months to Colombia and Peru, given the closing of production gaps; these economies 
would thus join the group of emerging economies in Asia and Eastern Europe which 
have already commenced monetary tightening. In the case of Brazil, the expected 
commencement of the cycle of rate rises will be linked to developments of the real and 
their inflationary impact, since the production gap continues to be markedly negative and 
no second-round effects are expected from the lorry drivers’ strike. According to the 
conventional Taylor rules,8 monetary policy maintains an expansionary bias in Chile and 
Peru and a contractionary bias in Brazil and Colombia. In Mexico the next policy interest 
rate movements will be adopted depending on developments in inflation expectations. In 
Argentina, as part of the agreement renegotiated with the IMF, the central bank has 
abandoned the inflation target as the nominal anchor of the economy and has chosen to 
set a zero growth target for the monetary base, so that its strategy to reduce inflation 
regains credibility. Similarly, currency bands were set (which are modified on a daily basis 
following a given rule) within which the central bank will not intervene in exchange rate 
markets.
In the realm of fiscal policy (Chart 7), Brazil continues to show sizeable imbalances and 
the government deficit is expected to reach 8% of GDP by end-2018 (with an interest 
burden of 7 pp) and the public debt ratio to stand at around 80% of GDP. The approval of 
the pension reform is essential in order to be able to meet the limit on public spending set 
for the next few years, although doubts remain about the scope of the plans that may be 
implemented by the president-elect. In Argentina, a sharp fiscal adjustment is projected 
for the period 2018-20, with a zero primary balance target in 2019 and a positive primary 
balance target in 2020. Public debt will stand above 80% of GDP in 2018, an increase of 
approximately 30 pp in the year, due to the valuation effect of the foreign currency debt 
(which represents a high percentage of the total), arising from the depreciation of the 
peso. Nevertheless, with the fiscal adjustment and high nominal GDP growth it is expected 
to decrease over coming years. In other countries in the region there have been no major 
changes in fiscal balances, although the fiscal scope for stimulus, if needed, is low. Chile 
and Colombia will present their respective proposals for fiscal reform over the next few 
months, which are geared towards encouraging investment.
SOURCES: Datastream, national statistics and Consensus Forecasts.
a October 2018 Consensus Forecasts for the end of the year.
b In Argentina the monetary policy framework based on inflation targets was suspended and changed temporarily to a monetary policy based on growth restrictions 
on the monetary base (ceiling of 0% month-on-month for the monetary base until June 2019 – except some positive growth in December 2018 and June 2019 
for seasonal reasons – or until inflation and inflation expectations have a clear downward path and of 1% month-on-month in the second half of-2019).
c Brazil’s inflation target is 4.25% ±1.5 for 2019 and 4.00 % ±1.5 for 2020.
2019
)a( snoitatcepxE)a( snoitatcepxErebmetpeStnemllifluFrebmeceDtegraTyrtnuoC
4.723.545.04oN8.42)b( -    anitnegrA
  2.4  3.4  5.4oN9.25,1 ± 5,4l (c)izarB
  7.3  6.4  0.5oN8.61 ± 3ocixeM
  2.3  0.3  1.33.21 ± 3elihC
  3.3  3.3  2.3oN1.41 ± 3aibmoloC
  5.2  3.2  2.1Yes4.13 - 1ureP
81027102
INFLATION
Year-on-year rates of change
TABLE 2
Yes
8  See the section “Natural interest rates and the monetary policy stance in Latin America”, in the “Report on the 
Latin American economy. Second half of 2017”, Economic Bulletin 4/2007.
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Growth projections for the region have been revised markedly downwards with respect to 
the previous half-yearly report: by 1.1 pp in 2018 to 1.5% and by 0.7 pp in 2019 to 2.2%, 
according to the consensus (see Chart  1). These revisions are due to Argentina, where 
negative growth is expected in both years, and Brazil, especially on account of the weakness 
in the first half of 2018; by contrast, the outlook for Chile, Colombia and Peru has been 
revised upwards. In Mexico, projections were revised downwards somewhat and expected 
growth holds slightly above 2%. The region’s potential growth remains low – reflecting lean 
productivity, limited spending on infrastructures and scant returns on education – and 
insufficient for driving the region’s convergence towards higher income levels.
The balance of risks is tilted downwards. The tightening of global financial conditions has 
already had particularly negative effects in Argentina, that could heighten and spread to 
other countries like Brazil, which is very vulnerable on account of its fiscal situation. A 
sharper depreciation of the currencies could lead to inflationary pressure and result in 
procyclical fiscal and monetary policies and in a contraction of the investment of those 
companies with high foreign debt. In the area of trade, following the preliminary agreement 
entered into by the United States, Canada and Mexico, trade tensions could spread to the 
region via two main channels: i) a further tightening of financial conditions, and ii) lower 
global growth, including a reduction of commodity prices on which the region is highly 
reliant. As for internal risks, those inherent to the implementation of the agreement between 
the IMF and the Argentinian government are worth noting as well as those to be faced by 
Brazil’s new government, given the unfavourable outlook for this economy; even if a 
reformist agenda and a fiscal adjustment are prioritised, their approval by Parliament 
seems complex.
6.11.2018.
OUTLOOK
SOURCE: Datastream.
a Light colour, primary deficit; dark colour, interest burden.
b 2018 Q2.
c 2018 Q1.
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
MOST SUBSTANTIAL FISCAL IMBALANCES IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL. THE INCREASE IN PUBLIC DEBT 
CONTINUES IN PRACTICALLY THE ENTIRE REGION
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Significant government deficits exist in Argentina and Brazil. There are no substantial changes in the fiscal balances for the remainder of the countries.
Increases in public debt as a percentage of GDP were recorded in almost all of the countries in the region.
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After holding the federal funds rate close to zero (in the target range 
0%-0.25%) since December 2008 and implementing several asset 
purchase programmes in order to increase the expansionary stance 
of its monetary policy, in December 2015 the United States Federal 
Reserve decided to start the process of normalising monetary policy, 
raising the target federal funds range by 25 basis points (bp). Since 
then, it has raised this rate on several occasions by 25 bp, to reach 
the current range of 2%-2.25%, and since October 2017 it has been 
gradually reducing the size of its balance sheet. The financial markets 
have factored in a continuation of the process of official interest rate 
rises for the coming quarters, although at a slower pace than that 
projected by the Federal Open Market Committee,1 the Federal 
Reserve Committee that takes the monetary policy decisions. 
Against this backdrop, the appreciation of the US dollar and the rise 
in US government bond yields since the beginning of 2018 have 
prompted a tightening in the financial conditions faced by emerging 
market economies. This box assesses the potential impact of a more 
abrupt than expected normalisation of monetary policy in the United 
States on the financial markets of a series of emerging market 
economies (Brazil, Chile and Mexico in Latin America, and South 
Korea, Indonesia and China in Asia). 
Theoretically, the tightening of financial conditions in the United 
States could spread to the rest of the world via two channels: the 
trade channel, based on the response of US imports to exchange 
rate movements (with the related effect on consumption and 
investment), and the financial channel, linked to the transmission 
of the higher US interest rates to the rest of the world (global 
financial cycle) and the depreciation of other currencies, which 
BOX 1IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES OF A FASTER-THAN-EXPECTED MONETARY POLICY 
TIGHTENING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SOURCES: Banco de España calculations, Datastream, New York Federal Reserve, and Borrallo et al (2016).
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FEDERAL FUNDS RATES IN THE UNITED STATES
%
The baseline scenario includes the path of the US federal funds rates discounted by the financial markets in September 2018 and the risk scenario 
considered is for the federal funds rates to rise more quickly, unexpectedly and more in line with the pattern seen in past episodes of monetary policy 
normalisation conducted by the Federal Reserve.
Under the risk scenario, the assumption is made that the term premium on ten-year US government bond yields will rise in the coming years to stand 
closer to its historical average. In line with the elasticities estimated in empirical studies, the transmission of this increase in the US term premium to 
emerging market economies depends on their macroeconmic fundamentals.
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1  https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojta-
bl20180926.pdf.
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would lead to a deterioration in the balance sheets of agents that 
have built up debt denominated in US dollars but which obtain 
their revenues in local currency. There was a marked rise in US 
dollar-denominated debt during the period in which the Federal 
Reserve held US federal funds rates at very low levels, while 
expanding its balance sheet.
The National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) can be 
used to simulate the global impact of a faster than expected 
monetary policy tightening in the United States. The baseline 
scenario includes the path of US federal funds rates discounted by 
the financial markets in September 2018 (see Chart 1). The risk 
scenario considered is one in which, unexpectedly, the federal 
funds rates rise more quickly, so that they stand at 4.5% at the end 
of 2020, i.e. around 165 bp above the level discounted in the 
financial markets for that date, and more in line with the pattern 
seen during past episodes of monetary policy normalisation 
conducted by the Federal Reserve. In addition, this risk scenario is 
based on the assumption that the term premium on ten-year US 
government bond yields will stand at around 100 bp at the end of 
2020, up from its level of -50 bp in September 20182 (an increase 
of 50 bp in 2018, 75 bp in 2019 and 25 bp in 2020) as shown in 
Chart 2. The empirical literature suggests that, faced with an 
unexpected rate hike by the Federal Reserve, the policy rates of the 
emerging market economies increase, on average, ten times more 
than the federal funds rate.3 According to the elasticities estimated 
BOX 1
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES OF A FASTER-THAN-EXPECTED MONETARY POLICY 
TIGHTENING IN THE UNITED STATES (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España calculations, Datastream, New York Federal Reserve, and Borrallo et al (2016).
-1.8
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
2018 Q4 2019 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2020 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Q4
UNITED STATES CHINA SOUTH EAST ASIA (EXCL. CHINA) LATIN AMERICA
Chart 3
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
2018 Q4 2019 Q1 2019 Q2 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2020 Q1 2020 Q2 2020 Q3 2020 Q4
UNITED STATES CHINA SOUTHEAST ASIA (EXCL. CHINA) LATIN AMERICA
Chart 4
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
Under the risk scenario, GDP growth in the United States and in emerging market economies is lower, with the difference being greater with respect to 
the baseline scenario in the Latin American countries and China than in the rest of Asia. For the Latin American countries in the sample, this is explained 
by the larger increase in the term premium, which causes a steeper drop in investment.
Under the risk scenario, the US dollar appreciates more in response to greater tightening of US monetary policy. The current account of the United States
deteriorates, while the external balance of the emerging market economies improves, with Latin America and China seeing a stronger improvement.
2  See https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/data_indicators/term_premia.
html for the calculation of the term premium in the US yield curve.
3  See, for example, B. Mackowiak, (2007), ”External shocks, US monetary 
policy and macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging markets,” Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Vol. 54(8), pp. 2512-2520, which 
estimates this relationship for a sample of emerging market economies. 
However, in previous episodes the central banks in Latin America 
reacted more strongly than those in Asia. For this reason, the negative 
impacts on the GDP of Latin America (Asia) could be greater (smaller) 
than those obtained in our simulations.
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BOX 1 IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES OF A FASTER-THAN-EXPECTED MONETARY POLICY 
TIGHTENING IN THE UNITED STATES (cont’d)
by Borrallo et al. (2016),4 the extent to which the increase in the US 
term premium is transmitted to emerging market economies 
depends on their macroeconomic fundamentals (see Chart 2).5
The results of the simulation can be seen in Charts 3 and 4. As the US 
dollar appreciates in response to the monetary policy tightening in the 
United States, the US current account deteriorates, while the external 
balance of the emerging market economies improves,6 to a greater 
degree in the Latin American countries than in the Asian countries, 
where the external balance is smaller if China is excluded. 
Although external demand makes a larger contribution to GDP 
growth in the emerging market economies, under the risk 
scenario, economic activity is reduced, as the decline in growth is 
stronger in the Latin American countries (-1.3 pp at the end of the 
reference period) and China (-1.1 pp) than in the rest of Asia. The 
simulations thus suggest that, if the monetary policy normalisation 
in the United States were more abrupt than the normalisation 
anticipated by the markets, it would have a somewhat larger 
negative effect on the Latin American countries than on the Asian 
countries. In the simulations, this result is explained by the higher 
increase in the term premium in the Latin American countries, 
which results in a steeper drop in investment. The better 
fundamentals of the Asian economies and the availability of larger 
buffers, such as international reserves, make them less vulnerable 
to a tightening in global financial conditions.
4  F. Borrallo, I. Hernando and J. Vallés (2016), “Los efectos en América 
Latina de las políticas monetarias no convencionales de Estados 
Unidos”, Monetaria, Jul.-Dec., pp. 297-347, CEMLA.
5  The transmission elasticities of the US term premium to emerging economies 
are calculated using as explanatory variables the economies´ inflation, 
international reserves as a percentage of GDP and five-year sovereign CDS 
spreads. The sample was updated to include data up to the end of 2017. 
6  The baseline scenario includes the increases in US tariffs on imports 
from China.
